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Ideas of Daniel C. Dennett, by Text
[American, b.1942, Pupil of Gilbert Ryle at Oxford. Professor at Tufts University.]
1978
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Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology
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p.15?
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p.76
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3158
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Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it
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p.7?
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p.77
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3159
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Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques
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p.44
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23803
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States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Schulte]
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1984
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Elbow Room: varieties of free will
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§2.2
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p.29
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3791
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Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world
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§3.2
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p.54
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3794
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Foreknowledge permits control
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§3.3 n14
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p.58
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3795
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Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)
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§4.1
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p.79
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3796
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The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations
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§4.2
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p.82
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3797
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I am the sum total of what I directly control
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§4.2
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p.87
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3798
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An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one
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§6.1
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p.132
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3800
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You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [PG]
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§7.1
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p.155
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3801
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Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse
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§7.3
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p.170
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3802
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Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine?
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§7.3
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p.172
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3803
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Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own?
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p.79
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3161
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If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey]
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p.133
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3177
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You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology
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p.55
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6624
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Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Lowe]
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1991
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Consciousness Explained
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2.4
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p.37
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7365
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Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up
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5.3
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p.126
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7366
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It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
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5.4
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p.127
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7367
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Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
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7.2
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p.173
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7368
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Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes
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7.2
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p.177
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7369
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Brains are essentially anticipation machines
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8.1
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p.228
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7370
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The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
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9.2
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p.262
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7371
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All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another
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11.4
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p.338
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7372
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In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special
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11.4
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p.342
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7373
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Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information
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12.2
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p.375
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7374
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Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours
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12.4
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p.397
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7376
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We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted
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12.5
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p.402
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7379
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If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
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12.6
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p.409
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7380
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Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
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13.1
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p.418
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7383
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The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain
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13.1
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p.418
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7381
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We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are
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13.1
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p.418
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7382
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We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them
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13.2
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p.421
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7384
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Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'
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13.2
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p.422
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7385
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People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
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13.2
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p.423
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7386
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Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes
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14.1
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p.431
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7387
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"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states
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14.2
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p.442
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7391
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We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown
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14.2
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p.447
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7393
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We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
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14.4
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p.454
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7394
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Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
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p.376
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p.
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14308
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We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Mumford]
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1994
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Daniel Dennett on himself
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p.238
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p.238
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3983
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Learning is evolution in the brain
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p.239
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p.239
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3984
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The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role
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p.239
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p.239
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3987
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Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence
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p.239
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p.239
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3986
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The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware
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p.239
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p.239
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3985
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Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature
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1995
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Darwin's Dangerous Idea
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§1.1
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p.21
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3804
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Darwin's idea was the best idea ever
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p.162
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4608
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Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Heil]
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Ch.1
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p.8
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4872
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Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain
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Ch.1
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p.17
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4873
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What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep?
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Ch.2
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p.68
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4874
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The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas
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Ch.2
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p.73
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4875
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We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems
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Ch.3
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p.81
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4876
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Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind
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Ch.3
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p.87
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4877
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Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster?
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Ch.3
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p.100
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4878
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The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors
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Ch.3
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p.101
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4879
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There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey
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Ch.4
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p.128
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4880
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Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons
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Ch.5
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p.159
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4881
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Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires)
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Ch.6
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p.211
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4882
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Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language
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Ch.25
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p.358
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2527
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Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind
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Ch.25
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p.362
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2523
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That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations
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Ch.25
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p.363
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2524
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A language of thought doesn't explain content
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Ch.25
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p.364
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2525
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Maybe language is crucial to consciousness
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Ch.25
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p.366
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2526
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Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity
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Ch.6
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p.128
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2529
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Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees)
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Ch.6
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p.128
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2528
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Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness?
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Ch.6
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p.129
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2530
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Could a robot be made conscious just by software?
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Ch.1
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p.19
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7654
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What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry
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Ch.3
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p.69
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7655
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The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies
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Ch.3
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p.71
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7656
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I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is
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Ch.6
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p.137
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7657
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Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines
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Ch.8
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p.177
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7658
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Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties
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